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ALD-232        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1264 
___________ 
 
JOSEPH EUGENE NAGY, 
Appellant  
 
v. 
 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION;  
ELIANA I. MCGRATH; ATTORNEY GENERAL TEXAS;  
THE 382ND DISTRICT COURT OF ROCKWALL COUNTY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-16-cv-09559) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 11, 2017 
Before:  MCKEE, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  May 25, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM  
 The appellant, Joseph Eugene Nagy, and his ex-wife, Eliana McGrath, are the 
parents of two minor children who are currently living with their mother in Rockwall 
County, Texas.  In January 2017, Nagy—who resides in New Jersey—commenced this 
federal civil rights action in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey claiming that, pursuant to a child support order issued by the Rockwall County 
Court, the Texas Attorney General was wrongfully garnishing two-thirds of his Social 
Security retirement benefits.  In the complaint, which he later amended, Nagy named as 
defendants Eliana McGrath, the Rockwall County Court, the Office of the Attorney 
General of Texas, and the Social Security Administration (SSA).  By way of relief, Nagy 
asked the District Court to restrain the defendants from garnishing any further funds, and 
requested compensatory and punitive damages.   
 The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds 
that: (1) the Office of the Attorney General and the Rockwall County Court were entitled 
to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; and (2) Nagy’s claims against his 
ex-wife and the SSA were barred under the “domestic-relations exception” to federal 
diversity jurisdiction.  Nagy timely appealed from the District Court’s order.  The SSA 
now moves this Court for summary affirmance. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  See PennMont Secs. v. Frucher, 586 F.3d 242, 245 (3d 
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Cir.2009).  We may affirm the District Court’s decision on any basis supported by the 
record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).     
We will grant the SSA’s motion to summarily affirm the District Court’s order 
because this case presents no substantial question.  See Third Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 
10.6.  First, the District Court correctly concluded that Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to hear Nagy’s suit against the Office 
of the Attorney General and the Rockwall County Court, which are state entities.  See 
Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984).  While a state 
may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, there is no suggestion that Texas has 
done so in this case.  Second, the SSA could not be liable for honoring the County 
Court’s writ of garnishment given that nothing in the record indicates that the order was 
not valid legal process.  See United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 836 (1984) (holding 
that, under the statute granting the United States immunity from suit with respect to 
support payments, the government “cannot be held liable for honoring a writ of 
garnishment which is ‘regular on its face’ and has been issued by a court with subject-
matter jurisdiction to issue such orders.”). 
Furthermore, because all of the allegations in Nagy’s amended complaint 
challenge the terms of the Rockwall County Court child-support order—and the SSA’s 
compliance with that order—his claims against McGrath are barred by the Rooker-
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Feldman doctrine.1  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 
F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a federal court may not exercise jurisdiction 
over cases brought by litigants who lost in state-court and are essentially inviting the 
district court to overturn the state-court judgment).  Lastly, insofar as Nagy intended to 
assert state-law tort claims against the defendants, the District Court could not exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over them via 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because all of Nagy’s 
constitutional claims were subject to dismissal.  See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 
(3d Cir. 2000).  
Accordingly, we grant Appellee SSA’s motion and will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s order.  See Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Nagy’s motion to 
strike is denied.  To the extent that Appellee SSA asked the Court to stay the briefing 
schedule pending resolution of its motion for summary action, the request is denied as 
moot. 
 
 
                                              
1 Because we conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Nagy’s claims against 
McGrath, we do not address the District Court’s application of the “domestic-relations 
exception” below.   
